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Introduction
Recent attempts by legislature bodies to prevent abuses by
paparazzi have brought into focus the debate over how far freedom of
the press should extend, and at what point its harm to the personal
right of privacy becomes intolerable. Public outrage over paparazzi
has led to new legislation which emphasizes the conflict between
freedom of the press and the right to privacy.
A. History of Conflict Between Freedom of the Press and Right to Privacy
Freedom of the press, as established by the First Amendment,'
has consistently been considered important to the survival of a
democratic society. In Estes v. Texas, the Supreme Court noted that
"the free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public
interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public
officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public
events and occurrences."2 In acknowledging the importance of a free
press, courts have extended First Amendment rights and privileges to
journalists beyond protecting the publication or broadcast of their
results. As Justice White expressed in Branzenburg v. Hayes,
"without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the
press could be eviscerated."3 In extending this constitutional
protection to news-gathering, the Court relies on the assumption that
the implicit goal of the Free Press Clause is to prevent prior restraint
on publication.4
The right of privacy finds its roots in a law review article written
1. The pertinent part of the First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
First Amendment was held to be applicable to states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925).
2. 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
3. 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
4. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (arguing that a holding allowing the publication of news to be enjoined
"would make a shambles of the First Amendment"). See also CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S.
1315, 1318 (1994) (holding harms in the First Amendment context should not be redressed
by prior restraints, but by subsequent civil or criminal proceedings); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936) (stating that the First Amendment was meant to
keep government from adopting any form of prior restraint on speech); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (noting that the primary purpose of the free press
guarantee is "generally, if not universally" believed to be the prevention of prior restraints
on publication).
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by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890.' In The Right of
Privacy, Warren and Brandeis argued for "a right to be left alone,"
railed against the press's pursuit of "idle gossip" and criticized the
press for its "prurient taste."6 While the word "privacy" is noticeably
absent from the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court, often
citing the 9th Amendment, has acknowledged that the right to privacy
is fundamental to the right of individual dignity7 and autonomy that
underlies the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.'
However, freedom of the press inevitably conflicts with the right
of privacy. James Madison made clear that the Founding Fathers
understood this potential harm yet considered the benefits of the
free-press to outweigh that harm:
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every
thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the
press .... [1]t is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to
their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the
vigor of those yielding the proper fruits. And can the wisdom of this
policy be doubted by any one who reflects that to the press alone,
checkered as it is with abuses, the world is indebted for all the
triumphs which have been gained by reason and humanity over
error and oppression... ?9
This inevitable conflict between freedom of the press and
individual privacy rights retained by the people has never been
5. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890). The ideas expressed in this article later found their way into opinions written
by Justices Warren and Brandeis.
6. Id.
7. Courts have recognized the link between privacy and dignity. See, e.g., Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971) (stating that the loss of control over
which "face one puts on may result in literal loss of self-identity, and is humiliating
beneath the gaze of those whose curiosity treats a human being as an object."(citations
omitted)).
8. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
The Ninth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
The right of privacy is also acknowledged in reference to the Fourth Amendment
as a protection against intrusions by the government. See Harris v. United States 331 U.S.
145, 150 (1947) (asserting "that the rights of privacy and personal security protected by the
Fourth Amendment '... are to be regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty;
and that the guaranty of them is as important and as imperative as are the guaranties of
the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen ....' (quoting Gouled v. United
States, 225 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)).
9. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 4 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED. CONST. 546,571 (1836).
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adequately resolved by law, and thus has led to the current problem
in dealing with the paparazzi.
B. Impetus Behind Current Interest in Curbing "Paparazzi"
"Paparazzi" is the plural of the Italian word "paparazzo," which
is defined as a "freelance photographer who aggressively pursues
celebrities for the purpose of taking candid photographs. 10 While this
phenomenon is not a novelty, the paparazzi's tactics seem to have
been growing increasingly aggressive, fueled by the general public's
seemingly insatiable desire to know everything. Princess Diana's
death while fleeing paparazzi 1 increased public outrage and gave
steam to celebrities' pleas for protection from the press. 2 This outcry
led federal legislators to introduce three bills in the House of
Representatives and the Senate, 3 and led the House Judiciary
Committee to hold a hearing on May 21, 1998, where celebrities
including Michael J. Fox and Paul Reiser, testified to the harassment
they had suffered as the result of aggressive paparazzi."
Simultaneously, California passed a law attempting to curb these
aggressive tactics. 5
The problem in crafting effective anti-paparazzi legislation is that
the First Amendment protects speech in general. 6 Moreover, the
great degree of difficulty in distinguishing between the paparazzi and
the rest of the press makes it difficult to avoid stifling legitimate news-
gathering by the press, as protected by the Constitution.7
C. Going Forward
In proposing a solution to the problem created by the paparazzi,
the federal legislature treads too much on the freedom of the press,
10. WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 794 (1995).
11. Diana, Princess of Wales, and her companion, Dodi Fayed, died in a car crash in
Paris while attempting to elude a group of motorbike-riding photographers. See, e.g., Craig
R. Whitney, Diana Killed in a Car Accident in Paris; In Flight from Paparazzi - Friend
Dies, N.Y. TIMES, August 31, 1997, at Al.
12. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Public To Press: Just Play Fair; They're Peeved by
Intrusiveness and Deception. But Are New Laws the Answer, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1997,
at B4.
13. See Tony Mauro, Paparazzi and the Press, THE QUILL, July/August 1998, at 26.
14. See id.
15. On September 30, 1998, California Governor Pete Wilson signed Senate Bill 262
into law. See California and the West, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1998, at A3.
16. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) ("The line between informing
and entertaining is too elusive for the protection of [the free press]").
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and in doing so renders these proposed laws unconstitutional. While
by no means perfect, the law passed in California is well-tailored to
curb the worst abuses without treading on the freedom of the press.
In comparing the federal legislation and the California law, it
becomes evident that the California law is a good model for federal
and other state legislators to consider. The California law also
suggests why it might be better to leave the anti-paparazzi solutions
to the states, rather than develop a federal solution.
This note will examine the proposed federal legislation and its
weaknesses, and then compare it to the California law, focusing on
these weaknesses.
Proposed Federal Legislation
A. Protection From Personal Intrusion Act (H.R. 2448)
The Protection From Personal Intrusion Act was originally
introduced in September 1997 by the late Congressman Sonny Bono,
and continues to be sponsored by his widow, Congresswoman Mary
Bono. 8 The proposed law creates criminal and civil liabilities for
"harassing" any person within the United States or a United States
citizen anywhere in the world.'9 The term "harass" is defined as (1)
persistently physically following or chasing a victim; (2) in
circumstances where the victim (a) has a reasonable expectation of• 20
privacy,2 and (b) has taken reasonable steps to ensure that privacy;
(3) for the purpose of capturing any physical impression of the
22victim for profit in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
Criminal liability exists under the bill even if the defendant fails to
actually capture the physical impression. 23 The criminal penalties for
harassment under this bill are generally not more than one year
imprisonment and/or a fine.2 ' However, if death results, the
18. See Mauro, supra note 13.
19. See H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. (1997).
20. Public figures have a greatly reduced "reasonable expectation of privacy" and are
often required to show actual malice in invasion of privacy actions under New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
21. "Physical impression," as used here and throughout the note, includes
photographs, video, audio recordings, and any other type of physical impression.





punishment is not less than twenty years imprisonment and a fine. If
bodily injury results, the punishment is not less than five years
imprisonment and a fine.25 There is no vicarious liability imposed, and
the bill does not make the sale, transmission, publication, broadcast,
or use of any image or recording that is otherwise legal by any person
subject to criminal or civil liabilities. 6
B. Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (H.R. 3224)
Another California Representative, Elton Gallegly, introduced a
similar bill in February 1998.27 His bill creates criminal and civil
liabilities for persistently following or chasing any individual within
the United States for the purpose of obtaining a physical impression
of that or another individual, if the individual (1) has a reasonable
expectation of privacy; (2) has taken reasonable steps to ensure that
privacy;28 and (3) has a reasonable fear that death or bodily injury will
result from the chasing or following.2 9 Additionally, the obtaining of
the physical impression must be for commercial purposes °.3  A
"commercial purpose" is defined by this bill as the expectation of
financial gain or other consideration for sale or transfer.3 ' Again,
there is no defense for not actually taking or selling the physical
impression. 2 Here, the criminal penalties are generally not more than
one year imprisonment and/or a fine.33 When the result is death or
bodily injury, the imprisonment is determined with reference to other
code sections (United States Code section 1111 or 1112, and 1113,
respectively).34 As in the Bono bill, there is no vicarious liability, and
the bill does not subject the sale, transmission, publication, broadcast,
or use of any image or recording that is otherwise legal by any person
to criminal or civil liabilities.35
C. Personal Privacy Protection Act (S. 2103)
This bill was introduced by Senator Diane Feinstein in May 1998,
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See H.R. 3224, 105th Cong. (1998).
28. See supra text accompanying note 20.









and is co-sponsored by Senator Orrin Hatch.36 Feinstein brought
together three respected constitutional scholars37 to assist her in
writing this bill.38 The bill creates criminal and civil liabilities for
harassing any person within the United States.39 It defines "harass" as
(1) persistently physically following or chasing a person (2) in a
manner that causes the person to have a reasonable fear of bodily
injury (3) in order to capture a physical impression for commercial
purposes." "Commercial purposes" is defined here as intended to be
or actually sold, published, or transmitted in interstate or foreign
commerce.4 There is no defense for failure to actually take the
physical impression. 42 The criminal penalties are generally not more
than one year imprisonment and/or a fine, but increase to not less
than five years imprisonment and fine when resulting in bodily injury,
and not less than twenty years imprisonment and fine when resulting
in death.43 As in the other bills, this bill does not create vicarious
liability and does not make the sale, transmission, publication,
broadcast, or use of any image or recording that is otherwise legal by
any person subject to criminal or civil liabilities.
II
Concerns About Proposed Legislation
Since the proposed legislation aims to restrict the media, there
are considerable constitutional concerns about restricting speech.
Such impediments on free press must be analyzed to assure that
constitutional rights are not unduly interfered with.
Regulations that place restrictions on speech are generally
distinguished as either "content-neutral" or "content-based" and the
standard used to assess the validity of the regulation varies depending
on how it is categorized.4 ' How the regulations are classified depends
on the motive of the government.6 If the regulations are intended to
36. See S. 2103, 105th Cong. (1998).
37. Erwin Chemrinsky, University of Southern California law professor; Lawrence
Lessig, Harvard law professor; and Cass Sunstein of the University of Chicago.
38. See Mauro, supra note 13.






45. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
46. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
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inhibit certain speech because of its message, the regulation is
content-based.4 '7 Alternatively, a law regulating speech is content-
neutral if it applies to all speech regardless of the message. 48 A law
might also be content-neutral if it regulates conduct and it has an
effect on speech without regard to its content. 49 Here, the anti-
paparazzi laws are "content-neutral" because they restrict the media
regardless of the content of the images or recordings that the
individual seeks to obtain.0
Because the proposed regulations are content-neutral restrictions
that impose an incidental burden on speech, the appropriate standard
for evaluating their constitutionality is "intermediate scrutiny."5
Under this standard, the court examines whether the regulation (1)
advances important government goals not related to censoring free
speech, and (2) suppresses no more speech than necessary to achieve
52that goal.
A. Advancing Important Government Goals
Privacy has long been recognized as important to the
preservation of autonomy, dignity, and individuality. 3 Accordingly,
privacy has been protected as a fundamental right, and the
government has a strong interest in continuing to protect that right.
While protection of privacy has traditionally been accomplished
through state property laws, such as trespass, advanced technology
has made it easier to violate a person's privacy without violating the
laws intended to protect it. For instance, long range camera lenses,
especially those mounted on helicopters, allow photographers to
capture private moments at home without trespassing.
However, state laws do work to protect privacy rights. For
example, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis was able to obtain an
injunction against Donald Galella, a free-lance celebrity
photographer, on the basis of a New York state law prohibiting
harassment. 4 More recently, in February 1998, a Los Angeles
47. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
48. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
49. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (holding constitutional a sales
tax applicable to cable television, but not broadcast television).
50. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
51. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
52. See United States v. O'Brian, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
53. See generally Privacy, Photography, and the Press, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1098
(1998).
54. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 993 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Superior Court judge sentenced two photographers to jail and a fine
for false imprisonment and reckless driving after the two cornered
Arnold Schwarzenegger, and his wife, Maria Schriver, at their son's
preschool."
Even if the state laws need improvement to better protect people
from the paparazzi, that does not mean that a federal solution is
warranted. While the federal government does have a strong interest
in protecting its citizens' privacy, this interest is weakened by the
states' ability to protect that right.
B. Does Not Suppress More Speech Than Necessary
Regulation of speech must be narrowly tailored to achieve the
government interest. 6 However, content-neutral regulations are not
"invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that
might be less burdensome on speech. 5 7 Therefore, such a regulation
that restricts speech is void "on its face" only if it is explicitly vague or
overbroad.8
1. Vagueness
A statute is too vague to pass constitutional muster if the
language is so ambiguous that a reasonable person would have to
guess at its meaning. 9 Laws that are too vague are void because it is
necessary that people know what is legal and illegal conduct.60 In that
regard, the proposed federal legislation presents three problems with
vagueness.
First, there is no explanation of the term "persistently physically
follow." All three proposed laws define harassment using that term,61
and it is not clearly defined. Nor is there a preexisting legal definition
that can give the phrase meaning. At what point would a reporter be
considered to be "following" a person? Is there a distance
requirement? Is there a proximity requirement? Additionally, at what
55. See Robert W. Welkos, 2 Photographers Sentenced To Jail, L.A. TIMES, Pg. B3
(February 24, 1998). The photographers were convicted under California Penal Code
section 236 (false imprisonment) and California Vehicle Code section 23103 (reckless
driving).
56. See O'Brian, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968).
57. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
58. See O'Brian, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622 (1994).
59. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,391 (1926).
60. See id.
61. Gallegly's House Resolution 3224 omits the word "physically." See H.R. 3224,
105th Cong. §2(a) (1998).
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point does the following become "persistent?" Is it a certain
continuous time? Is it to be measured in number of times per day,
week, or month? Because there is no way to determine the meaning
outside of a courtroom, the language appears to be unconstitutionally
vague.
Second, there is no clear standard for enforcement. One of the
principle policies behind the vagueness doctrine is to avoid
inconsistent enforcement of laws.62 Because it is not clear what
constitutes "persistently physically following or chasing," how are law
enforcement officials expected to determine when a violation has
occurred? This lack of clarity gives officials overly broad discretion in
applying the regulation, thereby allowing the possibility of arbitrary,
discriminatory, and inconsistent enforcement.
Third, the proposed laws lack intent requirements. Feinstein's
and Gallegly's bills only require an intent to capture a visual image,
sound recording, or other physical impression, but do not require an
intent to harass.63 Bono's bill has no intent requirement whatsoever.64
Thus, whether the harassment occurs intentionally, willfully,
maliciously, negligently or accidentally, the punishment is the same.
Not specifying the intent required for a violation makes it more
difficult for people to know what is or is not legal conduct, and thus,
these laws are overly vague.
Because the legislation lacks clear definition of its terms, lacks a
clear enforcement standard, and lacks an intent requirement, it is
impermissibly vague, and therefore unconstitutional.
2. Overbreadth
A statute is overbroad if application of the statute prohibits a
significant amount of speech that is protected under the First
Amendment.65 Criminal statutes, such as the proposed federal
legislation, must be scrutinized with particular care.66 The proposed
federal legislation is arguably overbroad because the bills apply not
only to unprotected news-gathering conduct, but also to a substantial
amount of legitimate, constitutionally protected media activity.67
62. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983).
63. See S. 2103, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3224, 105th Cong. (1998).
64. See H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. (1997).
65. See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987).
66. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
67. See Houston, 482 U.S. at 460 (holding that an ordinance was overbroad for
applying not only to "fighting words," which are not constitutionally protected speech, but
to protected speech as well).
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Because the bills could stifle legitimate news-gathering, not just
tabloid photographers, it seems that the bills are overbroad.
However, because the proposed legislation does not regulate
"pure speech," but rather the conduct of journalists in such a way as
to restrict speech to some extent, the overbreadth must be substantial
when viewed in relation to the legitimate reach of the statute.
Additionally, courts have been reluctant to declare regulations
overbroad and have instead construed them narrowly whenever
possible.69 While possible, it does not seem probable that the
proposed legislation could successfully be challenged for being
overbroad.
Because of the problems the proposed federal legislation has
with vagueness, and possibly, with overbreadth, the laws appear to
lack the narrow tailoring necessary to make them valid. Because
these concerns seem to outweigh the federal governmental interest in
protecting individual rights of privacy, the proposed legislation is
most likely unconstitutional.
C. Additional Constitutional Considerations
The legislation may also be unconstitutional for suppressing
more speech than is necessary because it is aimed specifically at
journalists.
The First Amendment does not protect the press from generally
applicable laws.7 ° However, the proposed anti-paparazzi laws are not
generally applicable laws. The Gallegly and Feinstein bills create
liability only if the person is trying to obtain the visual image or sound
recording "for commercial purposes."" The Bono bill only creates
liability if the person is trying obtain the visual image or sound
recording "for profit in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. ''"
All of these bills single out members of the media, the people looking
to make money from the photographs or recordings, for punishment.
The laws do not apply to crazed fans seeking photographs or
68. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
69. See U.S. v. Thirty Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
70. See Cohen v. Cowles Media, Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). See, e.g., Anderson v.
WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding that the First Amendment is
not a defense to trespassing); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 780-81 (Wis. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that the First Amendment is not a defense to trespassing); Annerino v. Dell
Publ'g Co., 149 N.E.2d 761, 762 (111. Appl. Ct. 1958) (holding that the First Amendment is
not a defense to invasion of privacy).
71. S. 2103, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3224, 105th Cong. (1998).
72. H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. (1997).
20001 ANTI-PAPARAZZI LAW
recordings for personal enjoyment, although they may be just as
dangerous.
The Supreme Court has clarified that regulations such as these
that single out the press for different treatment are presumptively
unconstitutional.73 Courts must apply a heightened level of scrutiny to
statutes that "although directed at activity with no expressive
component, impose a disproportionate burden upon those engage[d]
in protected First Amendment activities."74 By targeting members of
the media, these proposed laws are probably unconstitutional.
Looking at California's anti-paparazzi law clarifies the
weaknesses in the proposed federal legislation, and reveals a better
solution to this problem.
III
The California Anti-Paparazzi Law
Senate President Pro Tem John Burton's Senate Bill 262 added
section 1708.8 to the California Civil Code creating civil liability for
physical invasion of privacy and constructive invasion of privacy."
A. Physical Invasion of Privacy
A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when they (1)
knowingly trespass (2) with intent to capture a physical impression of
the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity, and (3) the
invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person.76
"Personal or familial activity" includes intimate details of plaintiff's
personal life, interactions with the plaintiff's family and significant
others, and the plaintiff's private affairs and concerns, but specifically
excludes illegal or otherwise criminal activity.7
B. Constructive Invasion of Privacy
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when they
(1) attempt to capture a physical impression (a) in a manner that is
offensive to a reasonable person (b) of the plaintiff engaging in a
personal or familial activity (c) under circumstances in which the
73. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983).
74. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 703-04 (1986).
75. See S.B. 262 (Cal. 1998).
76. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (a) (Deering Supp. 1999).
77. Id. at § 1708.8(k).
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plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy,78 or (2) through
means of a visual or auditory enhancing device without which this
physical impression could not have been obtained without
trespassing.79 Constructive invasion of privacy uses the same
definition of "personal or familial activity" as physical invasion of
privacy.'
C. Damages
Anyone who commits either physical or constructive invasion of
privacy, or both, is liable for treble damages. 8' There may also be
liability for punitive damages. Additionally, if it is proven that the
invasion of privacy was committed for a commercial purpose, then
any of the proceeds or consideration received as a result of the
violation can be taken away. 2 "Commercial purpose" is defined here
as the expectation of a sale, financial gain, or other consideration."
The liability also extends to those who direct, solicit, actually induce
or actually cause others to physically or constructively invade
plaintiff's privacy." Failure to actually obtain or sell an image,
recording, or physical impression is not a defense to violating this
law.85 However, sale, transmission, publication, broadcast, or use of





Comparison of the California law with the proposed federal
legislation emphasizes the federal legislation's three major
weaknesses: vagueness, overbreadth, and disproportionate impact on
journalists.
A. Vagueness
Unlike the federal legislation, the terms in the California statute
are specifically defined. The statute defines "personal or familial
78. See supra text accompanying note 20.
79. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1708.8(b) (Deering Supp. 1999).
80. Id. § 1708.8(k).
81. See id. § 1708.8(c).
82. See id.
83. See id. § 1708.80).
84. Id. § 1708.8(d).
85. See id. § 1708.8(i).
86. See id. § 1708.8(e).
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activity" and specifically excludes illegal or otherwise criminal
activity.8
The California law is also easier to enforce than the proposed
federal legislation. Constructive invasion of privacy uses a
"reasonable person" standard for determining if the manner is
offensive.8 This makes it clearer than considering what is reasonable
from the plaintiff's perspective as contemplated by the federal bills.
Furthermore, the reasonable person standard is a common standard
for torts, so there is a lot of case law to rely upon.89 Additionally,,the
law requires either actual trespass or use of enhanced visual or
auditory devices that would otherwise have required trespass,' which
creates a clearer line for what is or is not a violation of the law. This
clarity leaves considerably less discretion to law enforcement officials,
which decreases the chance of arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement of the law.
In addition, there is considerably less of a problem with the
intent requirement. Physical invasion of privacy has an intent
requirement - a person must "knowingly" trespass.9' Constructive
invasion of privacy does not have an intent requirement. However,
given the requirement to use enhancing devices,92 it is less likely to be
accidental. Additionally, there is no jail term attached to violation of
the law, making the punishment less severe.
B. Overbreadth
The California law is considerably narrower than the federally
proposed legislation. First, the law only creates liability when the
plaintiff is in a private place, since it requires that the violator either
trespass or use devices that if not available would require trespass to
capture the same physical impression. 93 One of the major drawbacks
of the proposed federal legislation was that it protected "privacy"
even in truly public places. Courts have been reluctant to hold
87. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(k).
88. See id. § 1708.8(b).
89. See generally Edward Green, The Reasonable Man: Legal Fiction or Psychosocial
Reality, 2 L. & SOC'Y REV. 241 (1968); Fleming James, Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable
Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1951); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The
Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health Report on the "Odious Creature," 23 OKLA.
L. REV. 410 (1970).
90. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (a) & (b).
91. Id. § 1708.8(a).
92. See id. § 1708.8(b).
93. See CAL. CI. CODE § 1708.8(a) & (b).
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journalists liable for conducting news-gathering from a public place.94
Second, the law specifically excludes coverage of illegal or other
criminal activity.9 This provision decreases the problems for news
reporters by allowing them to do their job. It does not allow the
criminals, cheats and liars to avoid media coverage by claiming that
their "privacy" is being invaded.
The punishment in the California law is also more appropriate
than in the proposed federal legislation. While a long jail term might
make some feel that justice is being served, the treble damages
imposed by California's law measures the true social cost of the
actions. With the treble damages plus the return of any profit, the cost
of paparazzi's services would have to increase to take into account
that risk. The only the way they could be paid the excess amount for
the images, recordings, or other physical impressions, is if the public
was willing to pay more, either in the form of increasing circulation or
paying more per copy. Thus, either the public will pay the cost
because it considers the information gathered important or it will not
pay the cost, and the paparazzi will be financially deterred from
taking such action.
Hence, the California law is more limited in its application and
outcomes than the federal legislation.
C. Aimed Specifically at Journalists
The California law is not specifically aimed at journalists. The
law covers crazed fans who are seeking the image, recording or
physical impression for personal use, as well as journalists, because
the liability is not limited to those who act for commercial purposes.96
The only difference in the treatment of journalists and fans is that if
94. See, e.g., Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 721 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983)
(finding no intrusion when defendant broadcast images of plaintiff's residence because the
broadcast did not show more than what could have been seen from the public street);
Frazier v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 907 F. Supp. 116, 122 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding
no intrusion when ongoing surveillance was conducted outdoors and in public); Machleder
v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp. 1364, 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding no intrusion when defendant
conducted an "ambush interview" because the interview occurred in a semi-public place
"visible to the public eye"); Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(holding that the intrusion upon seclusion tort "does not apply to matters which occur in a
public place or a place otherwise open to the public eye"); Aisenson v. American Broad.
Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that filming plaintiff in his driveway
was not an unreasonable and highly offensive intrusion upon seclusion).
95. See supra, note 77
96. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (Deering Supp. 1999).
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the violator is profiting from the activity, they are liable for the
proceeds.97
However, this is not a solution the federal legislators can use.
The problem is that Congress lacks the authority to pass regulations
in this area. Since state law already regulates this area,98 the easiest
way for Congress to gain that authority is to bring the legislation
within the Commerce Clause of the Constitution with such phrases, as
"for commercial purposes" or "for profit, or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce.""
The effect of the differences between the California law and the
proposed federal legislation is clearly seen when evaluating the
constitutional validity of the restriction on speech imposed by the
California statute. The California law is content-neutral because it
regulates conduct and has an effect on speech without regard to its
content. 1'° Since it is content-neutral, intermediate review is the
appropriate standard. '0 There is an argument that it is content-based
and thus subject to strict scrutiny"0 2 because it requires that the subject
of the image, recording or other physical impression be of a personal
or familial activity, not a criminal or otherwise illegal activity.
However, the law does not prevent media coverage of personal or
familial activities of a public or private figure. It only prevents the
media or fans from doing so in a way that harasses that person.
Additionally, whether a law is content-based or content-neutral turns
on the government's motive. 3 If the regulation is intended to inhibit
certain speech because of its message, the regulation would be
content-based. ' However, the motive here is to prevent problematic
behavior by those pursuing visual images or audio recordings. Thus,
the law is much more likely to be considered content-neutral. Under
the required intermediate review, ' the California law's mitigation of
97. See id. § 1708.8(c).
98. Including harassment, trespass, stalking and related conduct.
99. This problem for Congress indicates that maybe this area of legislation would be
better off being resolved with state law, especially in light of the other weaknesses in the
proposed federal legislation.
100. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499
U.S. 439 (1991) (holding constitutional a sales tax applicable to cable television, but not
broadcast television).
101. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
102. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
103. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
104. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
105. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
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constitutional problems persisting in the federal legislation makes it
much more likely to pass judicial scrutiny despite imposing actual
restrictions on the freedom of the press.
V
Conclusion
California's approach to problems with the paparazzi is better
tailored for the task of curbing aggressive paparazzi tactics than its
federal counterpart. Additionally, the California statute minimizes
restrictions on freedom of the press. This approach should be
considered by Congress and other states trying to find a solution to
the problem.

